Human capital is supposed to be an important factor for innovation and economic development. However, the long-run impact of human capital on current innovation and economic development is still a black box, in particular at the regional level. Therefore, this paper makes the link between the past and the present. Using a large new dataset on regional human capital and other factors in the 19 th and 20 th century, we find that past regional human capital is a key factor explaining current regional disparities in innovation and economic development.
Introduction
Economic development is one of the predominant research areas in economics. Many theories have been developed to better understand the causes and consequences of economic development and growth. For example, some of the most important fundamental factors for long-run growth are the quality of institutions (e.g., North 1981 , Acemoglu et al. 2005 ) and geography and naturally given geographical conditions (e.g., Diamond 1997, Engerman and Sokoloff 2000) . Approximate causes of growth include income inequality (e.g., Alesina and Rodrick 1994, Persson and Tabellini 1994) , land inequality (e.g., Galor et al. 2009 ) and human capital accumulation Moav 2002, Glaeser et al. 2004) .
For instance, an increase in human capital may induce a rise in the number of innovative entrepreneurs and products, thus indirectly spurring economic development through the channel of innovation. In fact, the crucial role of innovation for economic development and growth has been underlined by a large literature in this area (e.g., Solow 1957 , Romer 1986 , Lucas 1988 . Nevertheless, the long-run implications of human capital on innovation and economic development need further research because this issue has only been touched upon in few contexts (e.g., Baten and van Zanden 2008) . Therefore, the question remains whether pre-existing human capital is important for the creation of long-run development.
Thus far, most of the studies in this area only take a national perspective by focusing on countries. However, regional differences in human capital may be at least as important as national ones (e.g., Cipolla 1969) . The use of regions allows to overcome the inherent problems of cross-country analyses and may explain why some regions are richer than others. In particular, human capital may play a crucial role in regional development.
In fact, in their recent seminal paper Gennaioli et al. show the "paramount importance of human capital in accounting for regional differences in development" (Gennaioli et al. 2013, p. 105) .
But is the effect of human capital also persisting? Their analysis is limited to current data and cannot evaluate any longer run influence of human capital on regional outcomes. We aim at assessing this aspect in this paper. Therefore, we analyse the long-run impact of human capital on innovation and economic development at the regional level in Europe. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that takes this long-run regional approach at the European scale, contributing a new spatio-temporal dimension to the existing literature.
Combining a range of databases for the first time, we employ a new and large dataset in our analysis. First, this dataset includes data on human capital levels between 1850 and 2010 for many European regions and countries. Second, the database also comprises relevant current data on innovation and economic development. More specifically, we measure current innovation by patents per million inhabitants and the level of economic development by GDP per capita. Finally, we add historical socio-economic control variables that stem from a number of different sources. These historical control variables include the share of agricultural employment, population density, infant mortality, fertility and marital status. We also include dummy variables for former Communist countries in Eastern Europe and control for capital regions.
Regions are coded according to the European Union's NUTS classification throughout time. In other words, we adapted the historical European regions to the current NUTS system to directly compare the historical to the current data. In total, we have up 265 NUTS 2 (or corresponding) regions in our database at a point in time. In this way, we are able to analyse the relationship between human capital, innovation and economic development in a regional and long-run perspective.
More specifically, using standard OLS regression models we regress current regional innovation and economic prosperity measures on a range of historical variables at 4 different points in time. Our baseline specification considers historical explanatory variables in 1930, the year in which we have the maximum number of variables. The results show that historical human capital is a significant determinant of today's regional levels of innovation and economic development in Europe. In particular, literacy has a significant influence on current patent applications per capita and GDP per capita. We employ a number of specifications to check the robustness of our results. Among others, supplementary results for 1850 (using age-heaping based numeracy), 1900 and 1960 (using literacy) confirm our findings. Therefore, our results suggest that historical human capital has important persisting effects on economic development.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we present the relevant literature on the relationship between human capital, innovation and economic development in Europe.
Then, we discuss the employed methodology, the underlying data and our econometric strategy. Finally, we show the current relationship between human capital, innovation and economic development and analyse the long-run relationship between historical human capital, current innovation and economic development. The last section concludes.
Literature
Human capital may directly affect economic development and growth or indirectly, in particular through the generation of technology. According to Acemoglu and Autor (2012) , there are several channels through which human capital may affect technological progress.
Firstly, they stress that the individuals with the highest talents may contribute to technological progress by the use of their human capital if they have the necessary access to educational facilities. These individuals have probably the most important impact on technological progress. Secondly, the workforce in more general terms may affect technology, first, due to the externalities derived from human capital and, second, because human capital alters and increases the incentives to invest more in technological progress. For example, it is possible that a technology is only sufficiently profitable if there are enough workers who have the necessary skills. Finally, technological progress may be influenced by the workforce's mix of skills and human capital.
In general, the importance of human capital was already considered in early works by Smith and Marshall (see Demeulemeester and Diebolt 2011) . However, it took much longer for human capital to emerge as a key factor for economic growth. In fact, the most important contributions were developed from the middle of the 20 th century onwards. In particular, Becker (e.g., see Becker 1964) is widely acknowledged as a founder of human capital theory, stressing that human capital increases the productivity of workers.
Similarly, Arrow (1962) highlights the effect of experience on technical change. In addition, Nelson and Phelps (1966) emphasise that human capital is also important for implementing and adopting new technologies. Later on, Schultz (1975) argues that workers are better able to cope with changes in the economic structure and handle new technologies if they have more human capital.
Around the beginning of the 1990s emerged new theoretical advances. An extension of the original Solow growth model (i.e., the human-capital augmented Solow model) was presented by Mankiw et al. (1992) . It explicitly includes human capital as a factor in the Cobb-Douglas production function. Another kind of growth models, the endogenous growth models, was initiated by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) . The former focuses on technological change and the latter on human capital accumulation. The aim is to endogenise the various factors which may lead to economic growth in the model.
Overall, these models consider human capital to be an important driver for economic growth. They have also stimulated further research, generating another branch of of creative destruction through innovation.
Finally, the newest contribution in the area of human capital theory and economic growth are the Unified Growth models (e.g., Galor and Weil 2000 , Galor and Moav 2002 , Galor 2005 , 2012 . Their aim is to explain economic development in the (very) long run. In these models, human capital is attributed a crucial role for the creation of economic growth.
All in all, these different theories show that human capital is an important driver for economic development and growth. Still, there has been some controversy about this issue over the last decades. In fact, Demeulemeester and Diebolt (2011) refer to several alternating waves of optimism and scepticism on the relevance of human capital to generate growth since the Second World War. The contributions by authors such as Solow (1956 ), Mincer (1958 , Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964) led to the consensus in the 1950s and 1960s that education makes an important contribution to economic growth. In contrast, the 1970s where more marked by scepticism in a time of economic downturn. The new important theoretical contributions of the 1990s (Lucas 1988 , Romer 1990 ) reinvigorated once again the case for human capital. These optimistic ideas were supported by different empirical studies (e.g., Barro 1991 , Mankiw et al. 1992 , Barro and Lee 1993 but also more critical voices appeared such as Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Pritchett (2001) .
Measurement error may account for some of these results (Krueger and Lindahl 2001).
Thus, Sianesi and Van Reenen conclude in their literature survey in 2003 that "as a whole we feel confident that there are important effects of education on growth" (Sianesi and Van Reenen 2003, p. 197) . In addition, the more recent studies by, e.g., De La Fuente and Doménech (2006), Cohen and Soto (2007) , Goldin and Katz (2008) and Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009) show the crucial impact of human capital on growth. The key contribution of cognitive skills (including numeracy and literacy skills) is further highlighted by Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) .
The literature on the impact of human capital and innovation on economic development and growth in the European regions is also large (e.g., Fagerberg et al. 1997 , Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi 2008 , Sterlacchini 2008 , Cuaresma et al. 2012 Therefore, we analyse whether there are persisting long-run effects of human capital on innovation and economic development, using regional historical human capital and current innovation and economic development data.
Methodology and data
Human capital, innovation and economic development are rather large and vague ideas whose measurement has to be specified in greater detail. The human capital data used in this study come from different sources. First, we employ the new and large database created by Hippe (2014) (Hippe 2012a) . Second, numeracy is -as literacy data later on -directly derived from censuses. Third, it refers broadly to the same population (the entire population, excluding certain age groups). This allows a better comparison of both indicators. Taking military data from recruits would not allow to take the major parts of the population into account but only a very small selected group: men, in military service, of rather younger age and limited to a defined small age range. Moreover, regional data are often not available.
In consequence, numeracy is the appropriate indicator which is also available for almost all European regions around 1850. Numeracy is measured by the age heaping method which has been used in an increasing number of recent publications ( Therefore, we employ the ABCC Index also in this study. It is defined as
where i is the number of years, j is a region, t is the point in time (with t = 1850) and n is the number of individuals.
Second, literacy was the standard education variable around the turn of the 20 th century and the first half of the 20 th century in many European countries. Illiteracy had to be eradicated -this was a common tenor in all European countries. Success, however, was quite different not only in these countries but also within these countries (see also Figure   1 ). For this reason, a completely literate population was not achieved in many European countries in 1900 and still in 1960 illiterates were more or less common in many European countries. This fact underlines our methodology to use literacy as our human capital indicator for the period. After 1960 one may presume that the ability to read and write is more or less attained by the entire population so that other education variables have to be used. We define literacy as
where rw is the ability to read and write, N is the total number of years and t is the point in time (with t = 1900, 1930, 1960) . The age definition is the standard contemporary definition.
Furthermore, innovation is difficult to be measured statistically. One standard way is to take the number of patent applications or grants (e.g., Acs et al. 2002 , Diebolt and Pellier 2009 , Diebolt and Pellier 2012 . In addition to patent applications, other variables that are used to measure innovation include investments in R&D (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal 1989) , changes in productivity (David 1990 , Von Tunzelmann 2000 , bibliometrics (Andersen 2001) and data on (international) expositions and fairs (Moser 2005) . Patent statistics have certain setbacks; for example, organisational changes or know-how cannot be patented and not all patented products become innovations (Griliches 1990 ). Nevertheless, patents are generally considered to be the best indicator (e.g., Lastly, the level of economic development is measured in a standard way by GDP per capita (in PPS) as presented by Eurostat (2014) .
We use scatter plots and regression models to analyse the relationship of regional human capital, innovation and the level of economic development. For the influence of historical human capital on current innovation and economic development, we employ standard OLS regression frameworks which are formulated in the following way:
where ln(Patents/c) is the number of patents per million inhabitants (in logarithmic terms),
ln(GDP/c) is GDP per capita (in PPS and in logarithmic terms), H is the human capital
indicator, X are other explanatory variables, j is a region and ε are the unexplained residuals.
X is composed of different variables which may have an influence on economic development. Our baseline specification considers X (and H) in 1930 because we have the maximum number of variables for this point in time. Thus, in 1930 the explanatory variables are total fertility, marital status, population density, the share of individuals not dependent on agriculture, infant mortality, a dummy for capital regions, a dummy for the newer EU regions and country dummies. There is a large literature showing that fertility can have an important effect on growth (e.g., Becker 1981 , Barro and Becker 1989 , Becker et al. 1990 , Galor and Weil 1996 , 2000 , Galor 2012 ). According to the quantity-quality trade-off theory, parents face a trade-off between the quantity (number) and the quality (education) of their children. Whereas the quantity of children prevailed during most of human history, parents began to prioritise child quality in the course of development. The increased investment in human capital spurred technological progress and economic growth. Ultimately, more child quality meant less quantity of children, reducing the number of children, leading to lower fertility rates and causing the demographic transition.
Therefore, the fertility transition was an important factor in the transition from the postMalthusian era to the modern growth regime (see also Galor and Weil 2000) . During our historical period, the demographic transition had already started in some regions whereas it was still to begin in others. Therefore, it is a relevant factor that we should include in our analysis. We use total fertility data provided by the famous Princeton European Fertility Project, which defines total fertility as "a measure of the fertility of all women in the population" (Coale and Treadway 1986, p. 154).
Moreover, marital status comes from the same source and is "the ratio of the number of births produced by married women in […] a population to the number that would be produced if all women were married" (Coale and Treadway 1986, p. 154) . In other words, this measure represents "the proportions married at each age" (Watkins 1986, p. 315 ) and can thus be used as a proxy for nuptiality. There have been important nuptiality differences in Europe in the past, as has most famously been put forward by Hajnal (1965) .
Hajnal pointed out that western Europe was characterised in the past by a specific and unique European Marriage Pattern (EMP). The EMP describes the fact that there were much higher average ages at marriage in western Europe than in eastern Europe (and the rest of the world). Thus, differences in the average age at marriage may also explain differences in economic development (e.g., de Moor and van Zanden 2010). For example, Foreman-Peck (2011) emphasises that this specific demographic pattern was an important force directly contributing to the development advantage of Western Europe by increasing innovation and productivity. Thus, we also control for nuptiality in our analysis.
In addition, population density is measured (in logarithmic terms) as the number show the relationship for historical GDP per capita estimates due to lack of data, Figure 2 shows that there is a relationship between this historical share and current GDP per capita.
Some outliers are apparent, such as Luxembourg (LU00) but the general pattern clearly holds. For this reason, we argue that we can reliably proxy for historical economic development with this variable. Given the fact that we are interested in the correlation of historical variables with current economic development, it appears essential to control for the initial historical level of industrialisation. The data come from Kirk (1946) .
In addition, infant mortality represents a variable related to health. According to Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) , low mortality may promote economic growth through different channels such as population growth and education. When parents face a high uncertainty about the survival of their children, they will demand a higher number of children. When the risk of child death is reduced, parents may increasingly replace child quantity by child quality. This decreases fertility and lowers human capital, leading to sustained long-run economic growth. Kirk (1946) 
Results

Relationship between patents per capita and GDP per capita today
Before analysing the long-run impact of human capital on innovation and economic growth, we consider the current relationship of the latter two dependent variables in our subsequent regressions. and Austrian Vorarlberg (AT34) apply most often. Finally, the lowest GDP per capita values have the regions in the two newest member states, i.e., Bulgaria and Romania.
Explaining regional patents per capita
In the next step, we use standard OLS regression models to dig deeper into the relationship between human capital and innovation on the one hand and between human capital and economic development on the other hand. More specifically, we regress current patents per capita (i.e., patent applications per million inhabitants, in 2008) on historical variables (in 1930) . We use the year 2008 because it provides the highest number of observations. 6 Note that we always include country dummies to control for country fixed effects. We report robust p-values to avoid problems related to heteroskedasticity. Nevertheless, all regions have the same weight, representing each an historical experience.
The results are highlighted in Table 2 . In each case, literacy is a significant positive explanatory variable of current patents per million inhabitants at the 1 % level. In other words, when literacy increases by 1 %, patents per capita increase by 4.3 to 5.4 % -a sizeable effect. When all variables are included (column 1), population density is positively significant at the 10 % level, while newer EU regions have significantly lower patent applications (1 % level). This negative sign (in all cases except column 6) confirms the descriptive evidence shown in the figure above. When only literacy is considered, the dummy for capital regions turns significant (column 2), meaning that capital regions have a higher number of patents per capita than other regions. However, the coefficient is insignificant in all other cases.
These regression results show that literacy is the most significant historical explanatory variable for current patents per capita. However, how robust is this result? We propose several robustness checks. First, we perform a horse race, including only literacy and another explanatory in each regression to check whether our human capital indicator can survive the direct comparison with other potential explanatory variables (Table 3) .
These regressions confirm our previous results, indicating that literacy is the most important historical variable for explaining current patents per capita. Population density also appears to play a role, being significant (column 5). Capital regions (column 8) and newer EU regions (column 9) show also significantly higher and lower patent applications, respectively.
Second, a related question concerns multicollinearity. It is possible that some variables are highly correlated and this may cause biased estimates. In particular, fertility, marital status and infant mortality are potential candidates. We may consider this by excluding first one and then two of these variables from the regressions and check whether the results are affected (not shown 7 ). It turns out that literacy remains significant as before and the basic results hold.
Third, we may introduce an alternative measure for historical economic industrialisation: agricultural production per capita. It is highly correlated to the nonagricultural employment share ( Figure 4) . As non-agricultural employment is more closely conceptually related to economic development, this variable may potentially better represent historical productivity and innovative activities, particularly in those countries still dependent on agriculture. Some urbanised regions have a higher employment in nonagricultural sectors and constitute outliers in this respect. On the other hand, Danish regions were more productive than their employment share would indicate. In fact,
Denmark was highly specialised in agricultural industry. We may test whether this alternative variable would change our results. In fact, in contrast to the non-agricultural employment share, historical agricultural production per capita is negatively significant at the 5 % level (Table 4) . This new variable affects in particular population density, which is not significant anymore. As agricultural production per capita is a productivity indicator for this sector, it may mirror the typical productivity benefits of densely populated areas.
Literacy, however, is still the most important driver of patents per capita. Its significance and coefficient remain largely stable, indicating the robustness of our previous results. We also re-run all previous regressions with agricultural productivity, but our results for literacy remain robust (not shown).
Fourth, until now we have used data for patent applications per capita in 2008.
The reason for this choice is that this year has the highest number of observations. Still, one could question whether this year really represents the current period. It could potentially be a peculiar year, not representative for other years, and thus biasing our in an additional bias that we have to take into account in its analysis. The numeracy results are, therefore, more tentative than those for literacy. The results are shown in Table 5 . The human capital variable is in each case positive and highly significant, and most of the time significant at the 1 % level. In 1850 and 1900, population density is also positively significant, while fertility is highly negatively significant in our reduced sample for 1960.
The coefficient is also relatively high for literacy in that year. The lower number of observations and thus the concentration on fewer countries may be an important reason for this. In addition, capital regions and newer EU regions are in several cases significant. 
Explaining regional economic development
Let's now turn to explaining current regional economic development. We use regional GDP per capita (in PPS) in 2008 as our dependent variable and reproduce exactly the same strategy as for patents per capita.
Globally, the results are similar to those previously shown for innovation (see Table 6 ). Literacy is a highly significant explanatory variable of current GDP per capita prosperity. This is in line with our expectations and the literature. However, in the other columns, this effect vanishes and the variable is insignificant.
In the next step, we proceed with the horse race between literacy and the other explanatory variables (Table 7) . Literacy is always negatively significant at the 1 % level.
In addition, most other variables are significant and show the expected signs. As before, the fertility coefficient is negative and significant. Marital status, competing with literacy, becomes insignificant. A higher population density in 1930 significantly increases GDP per capita, illustrating the potential positive effect of a dense population. In contrast, a rise in infant mortality has a negative significant effect (at the 10 % level), and the employment share in sectors other than agriculture is positive and significant. However, the previous results suggest that when we include all variables only the literacy effect survives (apart from the significance of the two dummy variables).
We further explore the issue of multicollinearity. One or two of the fertility, marital status and infant mortality variables are dropped in different specifications (not shown). However, this does not affect any significance level or even sign in our baseline specification in we do not lose observations as in the case of patents. However, this alternative definition of our independent variable does not change our results and confirms once more the importance of human capital (not shown).
Finally, we consider other historical points in time to explain current GDP per capita (Table 9) These results for human capital and other indicators at different historical points in time suggest that those regions that had a higher endowment in human capital in the past, that is even more than one hundred years ago, have higher GDP per capita levels today than those regions which lagged behind. Moreover, capital regions are more prosperous than other regions.
To conclude, we find a positive and significant influence of historical human capital on current innovation and economic development. Human capital appears to be the most important factor contributing to today's innovation and economic development in our analysis. This suggests that human capital formation in Europe at the regional level is an important driver of economic development in the long run.
Conclusion
This paper has focused on the relationship between human capital, innovation and economic development in the European regions in a long-term perspective. There already exists a large literature on the effects of human capital on economic growth (e.g.,
Demeulemeester and Diebolt 2011) and regional human capital on economic development (e.g., Gennaioli et al. 2013) . Globally, human capital is assessed to be crucial for regional economic development today. But is this a persisting effect? So far, there is (almost) no evidence for the regional level in most of Europe in the long run. Therefore, by using a large and new dataset we analyse the relationship between historical human capital and current economic indicators in the European regions.
We have employed different indicators of human capital, innovation and economic development. These proxies are literacy and numeracy for human capital, patent applications per million inhabitants for innovation and GDP per capita (in PPS) for economic development. Regions have been defined according to the NUTS classification system set up by the European Union to allow a maximum of comparability throughout time. Human capital is proxied by literacy in 1930. We add further control variables, such as fertility, nuptiality, infant mortality, population density, share of employment in non-agricultural sectors, agricultural productivity and dummy variables for capital regions and the regions of the newer EU countries. To check the robustness of our results we provide a number of robustness checks. We include and exclude the different independent variables and provide an additional definition of each dependent variable. In addition to 1930, we alternatively consider numeracy (i.e., age heaping) in 1850 and literacy in 1900 and 1960.
In all cases, we include country dummies to account for country fixed effects.
The results show that human capital is the most significant historical factor to explain current patent applications per capita and current GDP per capita. Literacy is highly significant in all proposed specifications. In addition, population density is positively significant in a number of specifications for patents per capita. Newer EU regions have generally lower patents per capita than the 'old' member states. Similarly, these regions have lower GDP per capita. Capital regions have generally also higher GDP per capita levels than other regions. Population density also often positively significantly affects current regional economic standards, while a low age at marriage has often a negative impact. Yet literacy appears to be the dominant factor. Independent of the point in time considered between 1850 and 1960, the results indicate that human capital is a significant determinant of current regional innovative and economic disparities.
Therefore, our analysis suggests that historical human capital formation is important to explain current economic prosperity in the European regions. For this reason, it appears crucial not to neglect long-term evolutions that have key implications for today's economic development. For this reason, still more advanced research on long-run human capital formation in the European regions appears necessary to better understand economic development in the past, present and the future. 
